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Conventional wisdom dictates that it is all-but-impossible to discharge 
student loans in bankruptcy. This contention, however, misstates the fact that 
bankruptcy discharge of student loans is possible—and it happens. This Article 
presents a statistical analysis of what happened when Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petitioners in the First and Third federal judicial circuits filed 523(a)(8) 
adversary proceedings—or proceedings to discharge their student loan debt due 
to an “undue hardship.” In our analysis, we found undue hardship discharge 
rates of 54% in the First Circuit and 24% in the Third Circuit. But more 
significantly, we found that undue hardship determinations were relatively rare. 
A plurality of cases was dismissed at the debtors’ behest. The next most common 
resolution was settlements between debtors and creditors. And when all forms of 
resolution were considered, 51% of First Circuit debtors and 46% of Third 
Circuit debtors who sought discharge of their student loans obtained some form 
of relief—either an undue hardship discharge, a settlement, or a default 
judgment. These rates, while not representing certainty, surely do not reflect the 
near-impossibility of relief that is often assumed when student loans are 
discussed in the context of bankruptcy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom dictates that it is all-but-impossible to discharge 
student loans in bankruptcy.1 This contention, however, is an exaggeration, at 
best—likely more of a misstatement. This Article presents a statistical analysis 
of what happened when Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitioners in the First2 and 
Third3 federal judicial circuits filed 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings—or 
proceedings to discharge their student loan debt due to an “undue hardship.” 
In our analysis, we found undue hardship discharge rates of 54% in the 
First Circuit and 24% in the Third. These rates, while not representing 
certainty, are likely higher than is often assumed when student loan discharge is 
discussed. Admittedly, we knew beforehand that student loan bankruptcy 
discharge was possible—both in theory and in fact. But we wanted to move 
beyond our anecdotal insights and document these occurrences in a more 
tangible manner. Achieving that goal turned out to be rather straightforward. 
In our review, however, we uncovered a more elemental misconception 
that caught us somewhat by surprise. Discussions about how student loans are 
treated in bankruptcy tend to focus on the classic judge-rendered undue 
hardship determinations. But these determinations—captured in the proportions 
above—represent only a small portion of resolutions of 523(a)(8) adversary 
proceedings.  
Between 2011 and 2014, only 10% of proceedings in the First Circuit and 
9% in the Third were resolved by undue hardship determinations. A plurality of 
proceedings was dismissed upon debtors’ motions or joint motions with 
creditors—44% and 46% in the First and Third Circuits respectively. 
Agreements between debtors and creditors to settle debts for lower amounts 
than what were owed were the next most common resolution, accounting for 
30% in the First Circuit and 35% in the Third Circuit. Even default judgments 
 
 1.  Amy Connolly, Bankruptcy case could make it easier to shed student loans, 
UNITED PRESS INT’L (Oct. 9, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/10/ 
09/Bankruptcy-case-could-make-it-easier-to-shed-student-loans/3361444380821 (asserting 
that bankruptcy attorneys consider the standard for discharging student loans “impossible . . . 
to meet”); Betsy Mayotte, Debunking the Student Loan Bankruptcy Myth, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/stud 
ent-loan-ranger/2014/08/13/debunking-the-student-loan-bankruptcy-myth (characterizing the 
prospect of discharging student loans in bankruptcy as “incredibly difficult”); Katy Stech, 5 
Things Student Loan Lawyers Ask Borrowers Who File for Bankruptcy, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan. 6, 2014, 4:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/01/06/5-things-student-loan-
lawyers-ask-borrowers-who-file-for-bankruptcy (“It’s nearly impossible to cancel your 
student loan debt in bankruptcy.”). 
 2.  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov 
(“The First Circuit includes the Districts of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto 
Rico[,] and Rhode Island.”). 
 3.  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/about-court (explaining that the Third Circuit includes 
Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands). 
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outpaced undue hardship determinations in the number of resolutions between 
the circuits.  
These trends suggest that the very framing of discussions concerning 
student loans in the context of bankruptcy is misguided. Therefore, we 
broadened our focus from simply challenging the conventional wisdom about 
undue hardship discharge to gaining a holistic picture of how student loans are 
treated in bankruptcy.  
This shift in focus produced a rather notable statistic: when all forms of 
resolution were considered, 51% of First Circuit debtors and 46% of Third 
Circuit debtors who sought discharge of their student loans obtained some form 
of relief—either an undue hardship discharge, a settlement, or a default 
judgment.  
Of course it is possible that only the most compelling debtors are pursuing 
discharge, while others with weaker claims are being counseled out of the 
endeavor. But that argument strikes us as more of a theory than a reality. We 
believe that the hyper-focus on judge-rendered undue hardship determinations 
distorts perceptions of both the frequency of student loan bankruptcy relief and 
how it is most commonly secured. These perceptions likely have a discouraging 
effect on debtors and lawyers who may be less inclined to pursue discharge of 
student loans, due to potentially exaggerated feelings of unlikelihood.  
This article provides a holistic, data-based view of what happened when 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitioners in the First and Third federal judicial circuits 
sought to discharge their student loans. The bulk of the analyses focuses on the 
four-year period, 2011-2014, though in much of our analyses of undue hardship 
determinations we focus on the 10-year period, 2005-2014.  
During the four-year period, only about one-tenth of one percent of debtors 
who filed personal Chapter 7 petitions sought the discharge of student loan 
debt; therefore, the numbers of 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings we found and 
analyzed were relatively small—118 proceedings in the First Circuit, 194 in the 
Third. This Article is the precursor to a national analysis that we are conducting 
and will publish soon. The trends in this piece are intended to be mostly 
illustrative. We do not assert that they are generalizable outside of the First and 
Third Circuits. Nonetheless, the trends provide a glimpse into an area of 
bankruptcy and law practice that is largely misunderstood.  
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the bankruptcy system, 
generally. Part II discusses the undue hardship standard, including the different 
undue hardship tests. Part III explains the different forms of student loan debt 
relief. Part IV presents the analysis of the 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings.  
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I. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY 
Of the powers granted to Congress by Article I of the United States 
Constitution, one is the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject 
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”4 Since 1898, creditor-debtor 
relations have consistently operated under the shadow of bankruptcy, first 
under the Bankruptcy Act of 18985 and, after 1978, the Bankruptcy Code.6 This 
section provides a brief overview of the consumer bankruptcy system, with 
special emphasis paid to the bankruptcy discharge and the concept of 
nondischargeability. 
The Bankruptcy Code is located in Title 11 of the United States Code.7 The 
relief provided by the Code depends on the chapter under which a bankruptcy 
case is filed. Individual consumer debtors8 generally file under either Chapters 
7 or 13.9 In Chapter 13 proceedings, debtors with regular income dedicate a 
portion of their post-petition wages to creditors under restructured payment 
plans for a period of three to five years.10 Upon completion of the repayment 
plan and ancillary obligations, the debtor receives a discharge of her pre-
petition debts. 
Chapter 7 proceedings, which are the focus of this analysis, are liquidation 
proceedings. Once a debtor files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, his assets (excluding 
 
 4.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 5.  Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 6.  11 U.S.C. § 101 (2014). The seeds of the United States bankruptcy system were 
planted in sixteenth-century England when, in 1542, Parliament passed the first modern 
bankruptcy statute entitled “An Acte againste suche persones as doo make Bankrupte.” 34 & 
35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-43). Bankruptcy in medieval England was nothing more than a 
collections device for creditors in which bankrupts, a category of persons limited to 
merchant debtors, were classified “offenders” and treated as criminals. See Thomas E. Plank, 
The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 500, 501, 502 n.76 (1996) 
(quoting the preamble to 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-43) and noting that bankrupt persons 
were referred to as “offenders” under that statute and 1 Jam., ch. 15, §§ 10, 17 (1604)). By 
1800, the year Congress passed the United States’ first bankruptcy statute, Act of Apr. 4, 
1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, English bankruptcy law was decidedly pro-creditor: only merchants 
were eligible for bankruptcy; voluntary petitions were prohibited; death or imprisonment 
awaited the fraudulent bankrupt; and the availability of bankruptcy was based on the 
commission of a wrongful act by the debtor. See Andrew J. Duncan, From Dismemberment 
to Discharge: The Origins of Modern American Bankruptcy Law, 100 COM. L.J. 191, 198-99 
(1995); John C. McCoid, II, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 361, 
366 (1988) (remarking that “the aim of [the discharge provision in the Statute of Anne, 4 
Anne, ch. 17, § 7 (1705)] seems to have been more to help creditors by encouraging debtor 
cooperation, than to benefit debtors”); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy 
Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 16 (1995). 
 7.  11 U.S.C. § 101 (2014). 
 8.  Individual creditors may also file under these chapters by way of an involuntary 
petition. See id. § 303.  
 9.  See 2014 Bankruptcy Filings, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/report-
name/bankruptcy-filings?tn=&pt=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5Bv 
alue%5D%5Byear%5D=2014 (last visited June 20, 2016). 
 10.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2014). 
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those exempt under applicable state or federal laws)11 become property of the 
so-called “bankruptcy estate.”12 The trustee of the estate collects and liquidates 
the debtor’s property and distributes the proceeds to the debtor’s creditors.13 
After the proceeds are fully distributed, the debtor’s pre-petition debts are 
discharged and his case is completed. 
The American bankruptcy system is fundamentally a remedial scheme for 
the benefit of all parties involved. By consolidating creditor claims into a single 
federal proceeding, bankruptcy ensures similar creditors are treated similarly 
and relieves creditors of the necessity of participating in a “race to the 
courthouse.”14 But the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he principal 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a fresh start to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor.”15 The “fresh start” policy undergirds the modern American 
bankruptcy system and is exemplified by those provisions of the Code that 
afford the debtor the chance to achieve economic independence after 
bankruptcy. For example, realization of the debtor’s fresh start is aided by 
section 522(b) of the Code, which allows the debtor to exempt a portion of the 
equity in his home, automobile, and other assets,16 and by section 362(a), which 
stays creditor collection activities upon the filing of the bankruptcy case.17 
No Code provision is more vital to the debtor’s fresh start than the 
bankruptcy discharge. Section 727(a) of the Code dictates that upon the 
completion of the debtor’s Chapter 7 case, the bankruptcy court must discharge 
the debtor’s pre-petition debts.18 A court’s discharge order enjoins creditors 
from holding the debtor personally liable on her discharged debts and from 
instituting or continuing legal proceedings on the debts post-bankruptcy.19 The 
 
 11.  See id. § 522(b). 
 12.  Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contains a list of assets included in the 
bankruptcy estate, including all of the legal and equitable interests held by the debtor at the 
time of the commencement of the bankruptcy case, any interest in property recovered by the 
trustee as a result of a fraudulent transfer, the profits or proceeds of any property of the 
bankruptcy estate, and any interest in property acquired by the estate during the course of the 
bankruptcy case. Id. § 541(a)(1)-(7). 
 13.  Id. § 704. 
 14.  See KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 242 (2009). 
 15.  Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (internal citation omitted). 
 16.  11 U.S.C. § 522(b). 
 17.  Id. § 362(a). 
 18.  Id. § 727(a). 
 19.  Id. § 524(a). Section 524(a) states, in part: 
[A] discharge in a case under this title . . . 
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continu-
ation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, re-
cover[,] or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, 
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; and 
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continu-
ation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect or re-
cover from, or offset against, property of the debtor of the kind specified 
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discharge injunction is thus indicative of the central focus bankruptcy places on 
the debtor’s fresh start, and is the reason individuals file for bankruptcy. 
While the bankruptcy discharge’s protections are broad, it does not reach 
all debts.20  
Section 523(a) of the Code specifies a number of categories of debts that 
are prohibited from inclusion in the court’s discharge order due to public policy 
concerns.21 These include debts incurred as a result of the debtor’s fraud22 or 
his “willful and malicious” injuring of the creditor,23 as well as for domestic 
support obligations and certain tax debts.24  
Student loans are included in section 523(a)’s list of nondischargeable 
debts. Unlike the other types of debts listed in that section, however, student 
loans are not categorically nondischargeable—they are merely presumed to be 
as such. The relevant provision, section 523(a)(8), provides that student loan 
debts are nondischargeable “unless excepting such debt from discharge under 
this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's 
dependents.”25 Thus, in order to rebut the presumption of nondischargeability, 
 
in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the commencement 
of the case, on account of any allowable community claim, except a 
community claim that is excepted from discharge under section 
523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1), or that would be so excepted, determined 
in accordance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of this 
title, in a case concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the date of 
the filing of the petition in the case concerning the debtor, whether or not 
discharge of the debt based on such community claim is waived. 
Id. § 524(a)(2)-(3). 
 20.  In addition to the categories of debts excepted from discharge discussed in this 
section, the Code completely prohibits the entry of a discharge order in certain instances. See 
id. § 727(a) (specifying twelve grounds for denying (or delaying, in one case) the entry of a 
discharge order). Further, debtors may reaffirm certain debts, thus ensuring that their liability 
on a debt survives bankruptcy. See id. § 524(c). 
 21.  Id. § 523(a). 
 22.  See id. § 523(a)(1), (2), (4). 
 23.  Id. § 523(a)(6). 
 24.  See id. § 523(a)(5), (14). 
 25.  Id. § 523(a)(8). The section states in full: 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), 
or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt . . . 
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph 
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's depend-
ents, for— 
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or 
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded 
in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or 
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, 
scholarship, or stipend; or 
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the debtor must establish that repaying the student loan obligation would 
impose an undue hardship.26  
II. THE UNDUE HARDSHIP EXCEPTION 
This peculiar treatment of student loan debts in bankruptcy as conditionally 
dischargeable raises two questions for the debtor. The first is substantive: what 
exactly constitutes “undue hardship”? The second is procedural: how does one 
pursue an undue hardship claim?  
A. History 
Prior to 1976, student loans were dischargeable in bankruptcy, and so 
debtors were not obligated to institute a separate “full blown federal lawsuit”27 
to discharge them.28 However, alarmed by sensationalized reports of newly 
minted physicians, lawyers, and other professionals discharging their student 
loan debts prior to setting off on lucrative careers, in 1973 the Commission on 
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (“Commission”)29 proposed that 
student loans be exempted from discharge, unless the debtor “has demonstrated 
that for any reason he is unable to earn sufficient income to maintain himself 
and his dependents and to repay the educational debt.”30 The Commission 
characterized the inability “to earn sufficient income” and “repay the 
educational debt” as “undue hardship.”31 
Congress took heed of the Commission’s suggestion, and in 1976 passed 
the Education Amendments Act.32 This Act prohibited debtors from 
 
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as 
defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, in-
curred by a debtor who is an individual[.] 
Id.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  In re TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 28.  Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism: The Case for Risk-Based Pricing and 
Dischargeability, 126 HARV. L. REV. 587, 595 (2012). 
 29.  The Commission was created by Congress in 1970 to study and propose changes 
to the bankruptcy laws. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (Jul. 24, 1970). 
 30.  COMM’N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A 
REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 
93–137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 140 n.15 (1973) [hereinafter “COMM’N REPORT”]; Frank T. 
Bayuk, Comment, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans Under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship Exception, 31 FLA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2004); Anthony Bowers, Note, Discharging Student Loans via 
Bankruptcy: Undue Hardship Doctrine in the First Circuit, 4 S. NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE 
SYMP. L.J. 143, 146 (2009). 
 31.  COMM’N REPORT, supra note 30, at 140-41 n.17. 
 32.  Educ. Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081 (codified at 20 
U.S.C. § 1087-3) (1976); Richard B. Keeton, Guaranteed to Work or It’s Free!: The 
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discharging their federally guaranteed student loans if the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy within five years of the debt becoming due, unless the debtor 
established that repayment would impose an “undue hardship” on himself or 
his dependents.33 Congress retained this formula when it enacted the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.34  
Congress continued to impose restrictions on the discharge-status of 
student loans into the 1990s. The Crime Control Act of 1990 extended the 
nondischargeability period to seven years,35 and section 3007(b)(1) of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 introduced the discharge 
limitations to Chapter 13 cases.36 Finally, in 1998 Congress eliminated the 
seven-year waiting period altogether, leaving “undue hardship” as the only 
mechanism by which debtors could discharge their student loan debts.37  
At the same time Congress was limiting the potency of the student loan 
discharge, it was expanding the types of loans defined as conditionally 
nondischargeable.38 The original nondischargeability exception only concerned 
federally guaranteed education loans; however, successive legislation extended 
its reach to student loans “made . . . [or] insured by a governmental unit, or 
made under any program funded . . . by a governmental unit or by a nonprofit 
institution of higher education,”39 and to student loans made under programs 
funded by nonprofit institutions40 and educational benefit overpayments.41 
Most recently, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005 brought private educational lenders under the protection of the 
nondischargeability provision,42 such that now the undue hardship exception 
applies to both federal and private student loans.43 
Thus, student loan debts, which were originally dischargeable just as are 
most unsecured debts, are now nondischargeable absent proof of undue 
hardship. This gradual strengthening of the protections afforded to student loan 
 
Evolution of Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy and the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in 
Hedlund v. Educational Resources Institute Inc., 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 75 (2015). 
 33.  Keeton, supra note 32, at 75 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, at 136). 
 34.  Id.; Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism, supra note 28, at 596.  
 35.  Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621(1), 104 Stat. 4789, 4965; Keeton, supra note 32, at 
76. 
 36.  Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388; Keeton, supra note 32, at 76.  
 37.  Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism, supra note 28, at 596 (citing the 
Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971(a), 112 Stat. 1581, 
1837). 
 38.  Keeton, supra note 32, at 75.  
 39.  Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism, supra note 28, at 596 (quoting Act of 
Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, § 3(1), 93 Stat. 387, 387) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 40.  Keeton, supra note 32, at 75 (citing Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 454(a)(2), 98 Stat. 333, 376). 
 41.  Keeton, supra note 32, at 75 (citing Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
647, § 3621(1), 104 Stat. 4789, 4964-65). 
 42.  Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59. 
 43.  Keeton, supra note 32, at 75.  
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lenders in bankruptcy occurred even though the Commission’s fears that young 
doctors and lawyers were threatening the continued existence of student loan 
programs were not supported by actual evidence.44 Nonetheless, by the time the 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission45 recommended repeal of the 
nondischargeability exception in 1997, the status of student loan debts as 
conditionally dischargeable had been well entrenched in bankruptcy law.46  
B. What is an Undue Hardship? 
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “undue hardship”; therefore, the task 
of ascribing a meaning to this term has fallen to the courts. Bankruptcy courts 
generally apply one of two tests: (1) the Brunner test47 and (2) the totality of 
the circumstances test (or simply, the “totality test”).  
1. The Brunner Test 
The majority of courts, including those in the Third Circuit and some in the 
First Circuit, apply the tripartite Brunner test to determine the existence of 
undue hardship.48 The test was first articulated at the appellate level by the 
Second Circuit in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. 
Under the test, the debtor must establish:  
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current in-
come and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself 
and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that addi-
tional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is 
likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment pe-
riod of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made 
 
 44.  NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 213 
(1997) (noting that “the available evidence does not support the notion that the bankruptcy 
system was systematically abused when student loans were more easily dischargeable”); 
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 420 
(2005) (writing that in proposing the undue hardship exception the Commission “reacted 
viscerally to anecdotal evidence of recent graduates who had obtained discharges of their 
student loans without any attempted repayment and in the absence of extenuating 
circumstances”). 
 45.  The National Bankruptcy Review Commission was an independent commission 
created by Congress to evaluate the bankruptcy laws. NBRC Fact Sheet, NAT’L BANKR. REV. 
COMM’N (Aug 12, 1997), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/facts.html. 
 46.  NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW. COMM’N, supra note 44, at 216. 
 47.  The Brunner test was named after the Second Circuit decision in which it first 
appeared at the appellate level. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 
F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).  
 48.  Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 
53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 373 (2013). 
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good faith efforts to repay the loans.49  
The debtor must satisfy each prong to establish the existence of undue 
hardship.50 If one or more prongs are not established by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the debtor’s student loans will be declared nondischargeable.51 
Under the first prong, the debtor must convince the court that his current 
income and expenses prevent him from repaying his educational loans while 
also maintaining a “minimal standard of living” for himself and his 
dependents.52 In this posture, the bankruptcy court must review evidence of the 
debtor’s income and expenses with an eye toward determining whether (1) the 
debtor has maximized his income to the extent allowed by his “vocational 
profile” and (2) the debtor’s expenses are no more than required for a “minimal 
standard of living.”53 This prong empowers judges to make value judgments, 
particularly regarding debtor expenses, in seeking to tie undue hardship to some 
rough conception of poverty.54  
The second prong obligates the debtor to point to the existence of 
“additional circumstances” that ensure his dire financial straits will endure.55 
Inability to pay is not enough; to satisfy this prong debtors must prove “total 
incapacity” to pay their debts due to realities outside of their control.56 Some 
courts have characterized this requirement as necessitating the existence of a 
“certainty of hopelessness,” a phrase that perfectly encapsulates the heavy 
burden placed on the debtor under this prong.57 In this stage of the analysis, the 
court will examine factors personal to the debtor, such as the debtor’s age, 
health status, employment status and prospects, and education level.58 
 
 49.  Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. Professors Rafael Pardo and Michelle Lacey have re-
conceptualized the test as consisting of the following three considerations: “(1) the debtor’s 
current inability to repay (current inability); (2) the debtor’s future inability to repay debt 
(future inability); and (3) the debtor’s good faith effort to repay (good faith).” Pardo & 
Lacey, supra note 44, at 496. 
 50.  See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish) 72 F.3d 298, 306 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
 51.  See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 
(4th Cir. 2005). 
 52.  Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
 53.  Armstrong v. Access Group (In re Armstrong), 394 B.R. 43, 52-54 (Bankr. M.D. 
Pa. 2008). 
 54.  Keeton, supra note 32, at 81. 
 55.  Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
 56.  Faish, 72 F.3d at 307 (quoting Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. 
(In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 57.  This language stems from the district court’s opinion in Brunner. See 46 B.R. at 
755 (writing that the “dischargeability of student loans should be based upon the certainty of 
hopelessness, not simply a present inability to fulfill financial commitment”) (quoting 
Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Briscoe), 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 58.  See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jorgensen (In re Jorgensen), 479 B.R. 79, 88 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). 
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A debtor will not receive a discharge of his student loans under Brunner if 
he did not make good faith efforts to repay his loans prior to filing for 
bankruptcy.59 This requirement is an attempt to protect the solvency of the 
student loan system by demanding that student loan debtors deal with their 
lenders in a way deemed acceptable by the courts.60 Under the “good faith” 
prong, courts examine many factors, including the amount the debtor has repaid 
on the subject loans, any pre-bankruptcy attempts to restructure his educational 
debt, 61 and the ratio of student loan debt to overall debt on which discharge is 
sought.62 
The Brunner test’s bright-line, simple approach to undue hardship has 
garnered its acceptance by a majority of courts, including the Second, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of 
Appeal.63 The Eighth Circuit and a majority of courts in the First Circuit, 
however, unimpressed with what they see as Brunner’s cabined approach to 
undue hardship, apply the totality of the circumstances test. 
2. The Totality Test 
While it is by far the most popular test, many courts are troubled by 
Brunner’s gloss on the undue hardship standard. These courts believe that 
Brunner’s “good faith” and “additional circumstances” prongs are too far 
removed from the text of section 523(a)(8)64 and that it’s compartmentalized 
methodology hampers bankruptcy courts’ discretion under the statute.65 Of 
 
 59.  Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
 60.  See Wolph v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Wolph), 479 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio) (writing that the good faith prong “serves the goal of helping to ensure that a debtor 
acts responsibly toward their student-loan creditor given that educational loans are, in most 
cases, extended without regards to a debtor's creditworthiness, with the expectation that the 
debtor will use their education to obtain remunerative employment so as to be able to repay 
the debt”). 
 61.  See Kuznicki v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kuznicki), 483 B.R. 296, 302 
(W.D. Pa. 2012). 
 62.  See Fabrizio v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Fabrizio), 369 B.R. 238, 247 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 2007) 
 63.  See Austin, supra note 48, at 375 & nn. 285-92 (citing cases). 
 64.  See Hicks v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2005) (“Requiring the debtor to present additional evidence of ‘unique’ or ‘extraordinary’ 
circumstances amounting to a ‘certainty of hopelessness’ is not supported by the text of § 
[5]23(a)(8). The debtor need only demonstrate ‘undue hardship.’”). The First Circuit 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel refused to adopt the Brunner test because it saw it as divorced 
from section 523(a)(8)’s basic mandate that the requirements that the debtor affirmatively 
prove the existence of additional debilitating circumstances and that she did not act in bad 
faith. Bronsdon v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 799-800 (B.A.P. 1st 
Cir. 2010). 
 65.  See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
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those courts that believe Brunner “test[s] too much,”66 most adhere to the 
totality of the circumstances test. 
Under the totality test, courts assess the following three considerations: (1) 
the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) 
the debtor’s and his dependents’ reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) 
“any other relevant facts and circumstances.”67 In adopting the totality test, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit68 noted that the totality test 
and Brunner assess many of the same considerations: both tests seek to 
determine whether the debtor’s financial resources allow for the maintenance of 
a minimal standard of living along with debt repayment.69 However, the totality 
test, in form, eschews reliance on good faith, “certainty of hopelessness,” and 
other such extra-statutory terms so, in that court’s opinion, more faithfully 
adheres to the statutory text.70 
C. The Adversary Proceeding 
Bankruptcy cases are much different from the adversarial actions litigated 
in federal district courts. In a Chapter 7 case, the bankruptcy court is concerned 
with the consolidation of creditors’ claims and the distribution of the proceeds 
from liquidation to the debtor’s creditors.71 There are no plaintiffs and 
defendants, but debtors, creditors, and court-appointed trustees, who ensure the 
smooth administration of the claims allowance process.72 In this manner, the 
bankruptcy system fosters and encourages cooperation among parties in a way 
that is uncommon in other areas of litigation.73 
 
 66.  Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 741 (Bankr. D. Me 2000). 
 67.  Long, 322 F.3d at 554. 
 68.  The First Circuit has not formally adopted a test for undue hardship. 
 69.  Bronsdon, 435 B.R. at 798-99 (quoting Lorenz v. American Educ. Servs. (In re 
Lorenz), 337 B.R. 423, 430-31 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006)). 
 70.  Id. at 799-800. 
 71.  Adam M. Langley, et al., The Case for a Constitutional Bankruptcy Court, 88 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 515, 529 (2014). 
 72.  The practice of allowing or disallowing claims and determining creditors’ property 
rights invokes something of an air of summary proceedings in equity. See, e.g., SNA Hut Co. 
v. Haagen-Dazs Co., Inc., 302 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2002) (“To determine whether a party 
has submitted itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, the relevant inquiry 
is whether the party has submitted a claim against the bankruptcy estate, thereby subjecting 
itself to the bankruptcy court's equitable power to allow or disallow claims.”). Whether the 
bankruptcy court is a “court of equity,” however, is disputed. See, e.g., Marcia S. Krieger, 
“The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity”: What Does that Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275 
(1999); Adam, J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial 
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2006); Daniel J. Sheffner, 
Situating Reimposition of the Automatic Stay Within the Federal Common Law of 
Bankruptcy, 47 U. TOLEDO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 73.  The process of discovery also fosters cooperation, albeit within the larger 
adversarial context. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
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The filing of a bankruptcy petition, however, does not eliminate or prevent 
disagreements between parties. In certain instances, creditors, debtors, and 
trustees may seek resolution of disputes through the institution of adversarial 
actions in the bankruptcy court. These actions, aptly designated “adversary 
proceedings” by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy 
Rules”), are subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure74 and have been 
characterized as “full blown federal lawsuits within the larger bankruptcy 
case.”75  
The Bankruptcy Rules designate “proceeding[s] to determine the 
dischargeability of a debt” as adversary proceedings.76 The debtor who wishes 
to have her student loan debt discharged by the bankruptcy court, therefore, 
must initiate the process by filing an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy 
court.77 To successfully initiate her adversary proceeding, the debtor must file a 
complaint and serve process on all interested parties.78 In this procedural 
posture, the debtor is now a plaintiff, and the student loan lender a defendant.  
 
Many debtors navigate bankruptcy without the benefit of counsel.79 These 
individuals, already facing or having faced a complex and specialized set of 
rules and procedures in their main bankruptcy case, must now represent 
themselves in a trial that contains a new host of obstacles. Those debtors who 
wish to hire a lawyer to litigate their adversary proceeding must pay their 
lawyer; for debtors already utilizing the services of a lawyer in their main 
bankruptcy case, this means an additional expenditure.80  
 
 74.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (listing those actions which are considered adversary 
proceedings). 
 75.  In re TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 76.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6). 
 77.  This is not the debtor’s only option. States have concurrent jurisdiction with 
bankruptcy courts to determine dischargeability. See Standifer v. State, 3 P.3d 925, 927 
(Alaska 2000). 
 78.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004. Luckily for the debtor, she need not pay a fee to 
initiate an adversary proceeding. The fee for filing a Chapter 7 case is $335. See Chapter 7—
Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics (last visited October 10, 
2015). The court may waive the filing fee if the debtor’s household income is less than 150% 
of the federal poverty line. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f) (1994). If the debtor is not below 150% of 
the poverty line, the court may assuage difficulties in paying the filing fee by breaking it up 
into installments. See id. The fee for filing an adversary proceeding is an additional $350. 
See id. However, the fee is waived if the plaintiff is also the debtor. See id. If the debtor’s 
bankruptcy case closed prior to the initiation of her adversary proceeding, however, she must 
file a motion to reopen. The fee to file a motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case is $245. See id. 
 79.  See Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other 
Debtor Relief, AM. BAR ASS’N (Dec. 29, 2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigat 
ionnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html. 
 80.  Attorneys’ fees vary by jurisdiction and depend on the complexity of the debtor’s 
case. A Government Accountability Office study determined average Chapter 7 attorneys’ 
fees to be $1078. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: 
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In proceedings to determine the dischargeability of a debt, the burden of 
proof is a preponderance of the evidence.81 This burden is bifurcated in the 
student loan context: the lender bears the burden of establishing that the loan at 
issue is a student loan. If the lender establishes this, the burden shifts to the 
debtor to prove that excepting the subject debt from discharge would impose an 
undue hardship.82 Because courts have imposed on the debtor the burden of 
satisfying multi-pronged tests that require proving a myriad of factors, burdens 
born by debtors are much more complex and burdensome than those born by 
the creditor.83 
III. STUDENT LOAN DEBT RELIEF 
As is the case with the substantive law of undue hardship, the relief 
available to a debtor who successfully establishes undue hardship is dependent 
on the theory embraced by the court. Some courts take an all-or-nothing 
approach, discharging the entire debt or none at all. Others embrace a more 
lenient, individual-loan-by-individual-loan approach. Other avenues of 
bankruptcy relief include settlement agreements and default judgments due to 
no-show defendants. Outside of bankruptcy, many debtors pursue 
administrative discharges offered by the Department of Education.  
A. Undue Hardship Discharge  
Courts do not only grapple over the substantive requirements of the undue 
hardship exception. They also disagree as to the extent of the remedy available 
to student loan debtors. That is to say, courts are split on whether a discharge 
order must encompass all of the debtor’s student loans or, rather, whether a 
court may discharge a portion of a debtor’s debts even if he did not prove 
undue hardship as to the entirety of his obligations. This disagreement has 
resulted in the advancement of three different approaches by the courts: the full 
discharge, partial discharge, and “hybrid” discharge.84  
 
DOLLAR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 23 (2008).  
 81.  Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (“Because the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants, 
we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants unless 
particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.”) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 82.  See Bloch v. Windham Prof’l (In re Bloch), 257 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2001); Koch v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Koch), 144 B.R. 959, 963 
(Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1992).  
 83.  Rafael I. Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On Access to Justice, Procedural 
Noncompliance, and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2101, 2116-22 
(2014). 
 84.  See Aaron Taylor, Undo Undue Hardship, An Objective Approach to Discharging 
Federal Student Loans In Bankruptcy, 38 J. Legis. 185, 225-226 (2012).  
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1. Full Discharge 
Some courts believe that section 523(a)(8) only authorizes bankruptcy 
courts to grant debtors a “full” discharge. These courts believe they are 
constrained by the plain meaning of the statute, which nowhere says 
bankruptcy courts can discharge a portion of a debtor’s student loan obligation. 
For example, in In re Conway,85 the court opined that there was no “authority 
‘in the Code or elsewhere’ for the judicial revision of the terms of debtors’ 
student loans.”86 The Conway court also decried “the ‘unpredictability,’ ‘lack 
of uniformity of outcomes,’ and potential inequities inherent in the subjective 
application of § 523(a)(8),” as reason to adhere to an all-or-nothing approach.87  
2. Partial Discharge 
Courts that take a more expansive approach to bankruptcy authority believe 
that under some circumstances they may absolve a debtor of a portion of her 
student loan debt, even if she has not satisfied the undue hardship test. These 
courts believe that partial discharge orders are within bankruptcy courts’ 
equitable powers.88 In In re Hornsby,89 the Sixth Circuit held that “where facts 
and circumstances require intervention in the financial burden on the debtor, an 
all-or-nothing treatment thwarts the purposes of the Bankruptcy [Code].”90 
Undergirding this point of view is the belief that an all-or-nothing approach 
incentivizes debtors to amass excessive student loan debt and, at the same time, 
penalizes debtors who borrowed within their means (and are therefore unable to 
establish undue hardship).91 
3. Hybrid Discharge 
The hybrid discharge approach achieves middle ground between the purists 
in the full discharge camp and the more equitable-minded courts on the partial 
discharge side. While hybrid discharge courts consider the partial discharge of 
aggregate student loan debt violative of section 523(a)(8)’s plain meaning, they 
believe that courts can assess the individual loans that make up the aggregate 
 
 85.  Conway v. Nat’l Collegiate Tr. (In re Conway), 495 B.R. 416 (BAP 8th Cir. 
2013). 
 86.  Id. at 423 (quoting Andersen v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Anderson), 
232 B.R. 127, 137 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999)). 
 87.  Id. (quoting Anderson, 232 B.R. at 129-136). 
 88.  See, e.g., Heckathorn v. United States ex rel. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re 
Heckathorn), 199 B.R. 188, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996) (holding that courts may grant 
partial discharges because “[t]he Bankruptcy Code is embedded in equity”). 
 89.  Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 
1998). 
 90.  Id. at 439. 
 91.  Taylor, supra note 84, at 226 (citing Skaggs v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. 
(In re Skaggs), 196 B.R. 865, 866 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996).  
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and order each one discharged or not depending on whether they impose an 
undue hardship on the debtor.92 Proponents believe that this hybrid approach is 
truer to the plain meaning of the statute and congressional intent.93 
B. Adversary Proceeding Settlement 
Most of the adversary proceedings in our analysis were resolved through 
settlements between debtors and creditors.94 Many civil litigants have long 
favored settling their disputes in private rather than at the conclusion of a 
public trial because litigation generally requires both parties to expend 
significant amounts of time, energy, and money.95 Settlement agreements also 
benefit the courts: out-of-court legal resolutions reduce docket congestion in 
overworked federal trial courts and thus conserve precious judicial resources.96 
For these reasons, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,97 the Civil Justice 
Reform Act,98 and other sources of federal law encourage parties to reach 
settlement agreements.99 
Bankruptcy litigation is no different in this regard from litigation in other 
federal trial courts. Given that bankruptcy law is very complex, bankruptcy 
caseloads are very large, and bankruptcy estates consist of limited financial 
resources that once belonged to a debtor who now has even fewer resources, 
bankruptcy courts frequently encourage settlement.100 In fact, the Bankruptcy 
Rules specifically authorize judicial approval of settlement agreements.101 It is 
therefore unsurprising that most of the cases in our analysis were resolved out-
of-court. 
Settlements in the context of 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings tend to take 
the form of full discharges of the debt, partial discharges, or dismissals of the 
 
 92.  See id. (citing Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Grigas), 252 B.R. 866, 
872 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2000)). 
 93.  See Lamanna v. EFS Services, Inc. (In re Lamanna), 285 B.R. 347, 353 (Bankr. D. 
R.H. 2002) (holding that the hybrid discharge approach “does not offend the plain language 
of the statute and still reflects the spirit of Congress in enacting Section 523(a)(8)”). 
 94.  See infra Part IV. 
 95.  See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlements, and Why 
Permit Non-party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 225-26 (1999). 
 96.  Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional 
Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 591 n.8 (1991). 
 97.  FED. R. CIV. P. 66. 
 98.  28 U.S.C. § 471 se seq. 
 99.  Lederman, supra note 95, at 257 (“Federal policy seems to favor settlement and 
disfavor litigation, as reflected in the Civil Justice Reform Act, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68, Federal Rule of Evidence 408's exclusion from evidence of settlements and 
settlement offers, and statutory support for private contractual agreements to arbitrate rather 
than litigate.”) (footnotes omitted). 
100.  See Lisa A. Lomax, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: Rule 9019 and 
Bankruptcy Mediation Programs, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 56 (1994). 
101.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
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proceedings (oftentimes as a precondition to pursuing administrative or other 
non-bankruptcy relief).102  
While settlement in student loan discharge litigation is a prevalent theme, 
the judicial tests discussed above are nonetheless relevant to our study. 
Settlement agreements are formed under the backdrop of a potential trial, 
ensuring that parties negotiate with an eye toward the court’s potential 
interpretation of undue hardship. 
C. Adversary Proceeding Default Judgment 
Several debtors in our analysis received discharge orders pursuant to 
default judgments when defendants failed to respond to their adversary 
complaints. Of course, it takes more than a no-show defendant to affect such a 
result. In order for a court to enter a default judgment, debtors must establish 
their prima facie case.103 This means a debtor must marshal sufficient evidence 
to satisfy whichever complex test his bankruptcy judge utilizes, even if he is the 
only party in the courtroom.  
D. Administrative Relief 
Bankruptcy is not the only avenue of relief for student loan debtors. Most 
federal student loan debtors may opt to make payments through income-
sensitive plans offered by the Department of Education. Through the Income-
Based Repayment (IBR) Plan, the broadest of these plans, debtors can have 
their monthly payments capped at no more than ten to fifteen percent of their 
discretionary income in a given year.104 After a mandatory repayment period, 
ranging from 10 to 25 years (based on the debtor’s type of employment and age 
of the loan), any remaining balances are forgiven.105  
A debtor may also receive an administrative discharge due to total 
permanent disability (TPD) or death. Under the first option, the debtor must 
prove to the Department of Education that she is totally and permanently 
disabled. This can be achieved by, for example, a letter from a debtor’s 
physician indicating that she suffers from a medical condition that prohibits her 
from engaging in substantial gainful activity and which will result in death, has 
persisted continuously for at least sixty months, or may persist continuously for 
 
102.  See infra Part III.D. 
103.  See, e.g., Roy v. Roy (In re Roy), 09-1406, 2012 WL 1523996, at 8 *1 (Bankr. D. 
N.J. April 15, 2010) (“The Court has reviewed your Request to Enter Default Judgment but 
cannot enter the judgment requested because you have not proven a prima facie case for the 
relief requested.”). 
104.  See If Your Federal Student Loan Payments Is High Compared to Your Income, You May Want 
to Repay Your Loans Under an Income-Driven Repayment Plan, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed 
.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-driven (last visited June 20, 2016). 
105.  See id. 
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at least sixty months.106 Also, a debtor’s death discharges his student loan 
obligations, as well as his parent’s obligation to repay loans taken out on his 
behalf.107 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF 523(A)(8) ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS 
Our initial interest in reviewing the 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings was a 
desire to challenge the oft-uttered assertion that student loans are “impossible” 
to discharge through the bankruptcy process. We knew the assertion to be false; 
but in the research literature, we found only limited statistical inquiry into the 
question.108 Therefore, we undertook this analysis with the aims of providing 
 
106.  In Certain Situtations, You Can Have Your Federal Student Loan Forgiven, 
Cancelled, or Discharged, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation#total-and (last visited June 
20, 2016). 
107.  T he student’s obligation is also extinguished upon the parent’s death. Id. 
108.  There are few empirical studies of undue hardship litigation. Rafael Pardo, a law 
professor at Emory University, and Michelle Lacy, an assistant professor in the Department 
of Mathematics at Tulane University, have produced the most meaningful scholarship in this 
area to date. Their first such study was published in 2005. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. 
Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the 
Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405 (2005). Using Westlaw’s electronic 
database, the pair conducted a statistical analysis of 286 undue hardship cases decided 
between October 7, 1993 and October 6, 2003 by bankruptcy courts representing every 
regional federal circuit. Id. at 434, 438. Fifty-seven percent of debtors in the cases studied 
received some form of relief. Id. at 479. They concluded that there were virtually no 
differences in characteristics between debtors who received relief and those who did not, the 
pair concluded that bankruptcy courts were inconsistent in their application of the undue 
hardship standard. Id. at 520. 
Pardo and Lacey published another undue hardship study in 2009. See Rafael I. Pardo 
& Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge 
Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179 (2009). That study was smaller in scope than their 
previous work, focusing solely on adversary proceedings commenced during the five-year 
period between 2002 and 2006 in a single judicial district (the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Washington). Id. at 202-03. In all, Pardo and Lacey assessed 115 cases, 
using the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system for the Western 
District of Washington bankruptcy court. Id. at 203. Just as they found in their first study, 57 
percent of debtors in the 2009 study received some form of relief. Id. at 213. The 
researchers’ central finding was that the scope of a debtor’s discharge was based on 
considerations other than whether he or she was able to repay her loans, such as the identity 
of the bankruptcy judge and the level of experience of the debtor’s lawyer. Id. at 229. 
Jason Iuliano conducted the most recent empirical study. See Jason Iuliano, An 
Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012). The Iuliano study analyzed a nationwide sample of 207 
adversary proceedings commenced in 2007, covering cases that went to verdict, as well as 
those resulting in default judgment, settlement, and dismissal. Id. at 499-500, 502-03. Unlike 
Pardo and Lacey, Iuliano did not conclude that there was a problem with inconsistent 
judicial application of § 523(a)(8), instead concluding that barriers to discharge exist because 
most debtors (99.9 percent according to the study) do not seek to discharge their student loan 
debts. Id. at 501. For a detailed critique of the Iuliano study, see Rafael I. Pardo, The Undue 
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insight about (1) the frequency of undue hardship discharge through the 
bankruptcy process, and (2) the factors that are associated with discharges.  
Our review of the proceedings, however, prompted us to alter our focus. 
We noticed a profound trend towards dismissals of proceedings and 
settlements. A plurality of proceedings was dismissed upon debtors’ motions or 
on joint motions with creditors. Agreements between debtors and creditors to 
settle debts for lower amounts than what were owed were the next most 
common resolution. These trends exposed judge-rendered undue hardship 
determinations as a surprisingly minor aspect of how 523(a)(8) adversary 
proceedings are resolved. Therefore, our focus became a desire to track not 
only the frequency of undue hardship discharge, but also student loan 
bankruptcy relief through all means, including settlements and default 
judgments.  
A. Scope and General Findings 
In selecting the First and Third federal judicial circuits for use as 
comparators, we logged docket data from a sample of 250 undue hardship 
determinations from all circuits.109 We then selected the circuit that had the 
highest percentage of undue hardship determinations in favor of debtors (First 
Circuit) and the circuit with the highest percentage of determinations in favor 
of creditors (Third Circuit). We believed that this admittedly blunt means of 
identifying circuits on which to focus would yield compelling contrasts. But as 
we logged fuller data, we found surprising statistical similarities between the 
two circuits, the most notable of which we discuss in this section.  
We initially set out to chart and analyze trends over the 10-year period, 
2005-2014. However, a noticeable dearth of settlement filings in the PACER 
and Bloomberg Law databases110 over this period prompted concerns about 
 
Hardship Thicket: On Access to Justice, Procedural Noncompliance, and Pollutive 
Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2101, 2124-42 (2014). For a piece that assesses 
undue hardship cases in the appellate context, see Ryan Alexander Freeman, Comment, 
Student-Loan Discharge—An Empirical Study of the Undue Hardship Provision of § 
523(A)(8) Under Appellate Review, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 147 (2014). 
Our study hopes to build on this developing area of research. As opposed to the first 
Pardo & Lacey and Iuliano studies, our research is not national in scope, focusing rather on 
two federal judicial circuits. Out study is beneficial in that, instead of focusing on simply 
published decisions, we utilized PACER and Bloomberg to analyze both published and non-
published bankruptcy decisions. Further, we analyzed not only decisions on the merits, but 
also settlements, default judgments, and summary judgments.  
109.  The sample was obtained by conducting a rather narrow search, using all of the 
following terms: “523(a)(8),” “adversary proceeding,” and “undue hardship.” We also 
limited the date range to only yield 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings filed between 2005 and 
2014. We then logged the first 250 results, irrespective of circuit.  
110.  PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) is an “electronic public 
access service that allows users to obtain [bankruptcy] case and docket information online.” 
It is hosted by the federal judiciary, and can be accessed via https://www.pacer.gov. 
Bloomberg Law is a legal research platform hosted by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 
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whether the databases housed all the records. As a result, the bulk of the 
analyses below focuses on the four-year period, 2011-2014. Fortunately, the 
number of dockets pertaining to judge-rendered undue hardship determinations 
was relatively balanced across the ten-year period; thus, we felt comfortable 
discussing many of the judge-rendered undue hardship trends using the longer 
timeframe.  
 
Below are some general findings: 
 
• It is exceedingly rare for Chapter 7 debtors to seek discharge of student 
loans. Only about one-tenth of one percent of these debtors in the First 
and Third Circuits sought discharge during the four-year period, 2011-
2014. 
 
• Overall, 47% of debtors in our review received full or partial discharge 
or other relief from their student loan debt. In the First Circuit, 51% of 
debtors obtained some form of relief. The proportion was 46% among 
Third Circuit debtors. In both circuits, the most common path to relief 
was through settlements.  
 
• Dollar amounts of discharged debts and settlement relief tended to be 
higher in the First Circuit. Settlement relief was proportionally more 
generous in the Third Circuit, however. In both circuits, larger debts 
were less likely to be discharged through an undue hardship 
determination. 
 
• Certain debtor characteristics were associated with higher likelihood of 
relief. Debtors who obtained undue hardship discharges were more 
likely to have unfavorable employment prospects, coupled with (and 
potentially caused or exacerbated by) health issues. Similarly, in the 
settlement context, unfavorable financial conditions, coupled with 
health issues, were most closely associated with relief.  
 
• Certain “structural” factors (those unrelated to underlying merits) were 
associated with higher likelihood of discharge or relief. These factors 
included the judicial circuit in which the proceeding was filed and, most 
prominently, whether the debtor was represented by counsel. Debtors 
who had their student loans discharged or received some other form of 
relief were more likely to be represented by counsel than those who did 
not. 
 
and it may be accessed via https://www.bloomberglaw.com/home. Both databases mirror 
each other in terms of available dockets. Nonetheless, we used both databases as a redundant 
means of searching for relevant dockets.  
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• In considering the data, it seems the “perfect” debtor—one who is most 
likely to obtain an undue hardship discharge or settlement relief—has 
the following characteristics: unfavorable employment prospects, an 
aggravating factor such as a health issue, representation by counsel, and 
an overall debt of $75,000 or less.  
B. Filing Trends: Chapter 7 Petitions and 523(a)(8) Proceedings 
According to United States Courts data, there were more than 91,000 
personal Chapter 7 petitions filed in the First Circuit and more than 175,000 in 
the Third Circuit between 2011 and 2014.111 Debtors in only a miniscule 
portion—about one-tenth of one percent—of these petitions sought the 
discharge of student loan debt. Searches of the PACER and Bloomberg Law 
databases yielded just seventy-eight 523(a)(8) debtor-plaintiffs and ninety-
seven related adversary proceedings in the First Circuit for the four-year period, 
2011-2014. For the Third Circuit, 147 plaintiffs and 177 adversary proceedings 
were generated for the same period. Table 1 charts the number of proceedings 
during both the 10-year and four-year periods. 
 
Table 1: Numbers of 523(a)(8) plaintiffs and adversary proceedings by 
circuit and timeframe112 
 Plaintiffs Adversary proceedings 
 2005-2014 2011-2014 2005-2014 2011-2014 
First Circuit 97  78 118 97 
Third Circuit 163 147 194 177 
 
 
Table 2 charts the 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings found in the databases 
by year. There was a noticeable increase in found records starting with the year 
2011. This increase prompted concerns about the completeness of the pre-2011 
records. Due to these concerns, most of our analysis and discussion relies on 
the 2011-2014 timeframe.  
 
 
 
111.  Over the ten-year period, 2005-2014, there were more than 220,000 personal 
Chapter 7 petitions in the First Circuit and almost 417,000 in the Third Circuit. See Caseload 
Statistics Data Tables, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-
statistics-data-tables (last visited June 20, 2016). 
112.  Multiple adversary proceeding numbers pertaining to an individual plaintiff were 
counted separately. However, multiple proceedings contained within one docket number 
were counted only once, unless a judge rendered separate undue hardship determinations. 
Similarly, consolidated docket numbers were counted only once. 
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Table 2: Number of 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings113 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
First Circuit 4 2 0 10 1 4 22 28 30 17 
Third Circuit 2 3 6 2 2 2 41 56 41 39 
 
 
Almost all of the 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings including in this analysis 
were resolved either by an undue hardship determination, a dismissal of the 
proceeding, a settlement, or a default judgment. The most common resolution 
was a dismissal, accounting for 44% of resolutions in the First Circuit and 46% 
in the Third Circuit. In addition, seven proceedings were pending in the First 
Circuit and six in the Third Circuit as of October 15, 2015, when the records 
were last reviewed.  
 
Table 3 displays the number of adversary proceeding per type of 
resolution, as well as the numbers of pending proceedings.  
 
Table 3: Numbers of 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings per resolution 
by circuit and timeframe 
 Undue hardship 
determinations Settlements 
Settlement- 
Dismissals 
Default 
Judgments Pending Other 
 2005-2014 2011-2014 2011-2014 2011-2014 2011-2014 2011-2014 2011-2014 
First Circuit 26 9 27 40 15 6 0 
Third Circuit 29 15 60 78 15 6 3 
 
C. Resolution Trends 
Discussions about how student loans are treated in bankruptcy tend to 
focus on the manner in which judges interpret and apply the undue hardship 
standards; but this framing provides only a narrow, skewed view of how 
student loans are treated in bankruptcy and the frequency of relief.  
As Table 4 highlights, judicial applications of the undue hardship standard 
were uncommon, accounting for just 10% and 9% of resolutions in the First 
and Third Circuits respectively. Dismissals upon debtors’ motions or joint 
motions with creditors were the most common resolution, accounting for 44% 
and 46% in the First and Third Circuits respectively. Settlements were the next 
most common resolution and the most common path to actual relief, accounting 
 
113.  Just as above, multiple adversary proceeding numbers pertaining to an individual 
plaintiff were counted separately. However, multiple proceedings contained within one 
docket number were counted only once, unless a judge rendered separate undue hardship 
determinations. Similarly, consolidated docket numbers were counted only once. 
318 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 27:295 
for 30% of resolutions in the First Circuit and 35% in the Third Circuit. Even 
default judgments, which were exclusively in favor of debtors, outpaced undue 
hardship determinations in the First Circuit and tied in frequency with undue 
hardship determinations in the Third Circuit. 
 
Table 4: Proportion of each type of 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings 
resolutions by circuit (pending cases excluded) 
 2011-2014 
 Number of 
proceedings 
Undue hardship 
determinations Settlements 
Settlement- 
Dismissals 
Default 
Judgments 
First Circuit 91 10% 30% 44% 17% 
Third Circuit 171 9% 35% 46% 9% 
1. Undue Hardship Determinations 
Between 2005 and 2014, there were only twenty-six undue hardship 
determinations in the First Circuit and twenty-nine in the Third Circuit. Table 5 
charts the per-year trends of 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings in which a 
bankruptcy judge rendered an undue hardship determination between 2005 and 
2014.  
 
Table 5: Number of 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings adjudicated by 
undue hardship determination 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
First Circuit 4 2 0 8 0 3 1 5 2 1 26 
Third Circuit 2 3 4 2 1 2 4 4 3 4 29 
 
 
The infrequency of undue hardship determinations is particularly apparent 
when trends among the individual districts within each circuit are tracked. In 
the First Circuit, the Puerto Rico and Rhode Island districts had no undue 
hardship determinations between 2005 and 2014; the District of Maine had one. 
In the Third Circuit, the District of Delaware had only one determination; the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania had two. Just three of the ten districts—
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania-Western—accounted for 73% of 
the total undue hardship determinations in the First and Third Circuits 
collectively. Table 6 charts these trends. 
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Table 6: Number of undue hardship determinations by district 
2005-2014 
First Circuit Third Circuit 
Maine 1 Delaware 1 
Massachusetts 19 New Jersey 11 
New Hampshire 6 Pennsylvania (Eastern) 5 
Puerto Rico 0 Pennsylvania (Middle) 2 
Rhode Island 0 Pennsylvania (Western) 10 
 
 
Undue hardship determinations can result in three general outcomes: (1) 
full student loan discharge, when a judge determines that the plaintiff has 
proven undue hardship pertaining to the entire debt; (2) partial student loan 
discharge, when a judge determines that the plaintiff has proven undue hardship 
pertaining to some, but not all, of the debt; and (3) no discharge, when a judge 
determines that the plaintiff has not proven any undue hardship. 
In reviewing undue hardship determinations, the most significant trend is 
the disparate rates of discharge between the two circuits. Judges granted undue 
hardship discharges at a much higher rate in the First Circuit than in the Third. 
For the 10-year period, 2005-2014, First Circuit judges granted discharge in 
more than half of the proceedings they resolved. Judges in the Third Circuit 
granted discharge in less than a quarter of proceedings. Discharge rates in both 
circuits were lower over the 4-year period, 2011-2014, compared to the 10-year 
period; but First Circuit judges still granted discharge in more than twice the 
proportion of proceedings.  
The First Circuit grants both full and partial discharges. Partial discharges 
are premised on the idea that debtors and creditors are best served when judges 
are allowed to consider the extent of undue hardship, if any, with nuance. Other 
circuits, including the Third Circuit, only grant full, all-or-nothing discharges; 
either every penny of the debt is an undue hardship or none of it is. First Circuit 
judges granted partial discharges in two of the fourteen proceedings in which 
discharge was granted between 2005 and 2014. Hybrid discharges were not 
granted in either circuit. Table 7 illustrates trends relating to 523(a)(8) undue 
hardship determinations. 
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Table 7: Outcomes of 523(a)(8) undue hardship determinations by 
circuit and timeframe 
 2005-2014 2011-2014 
 Total Discharge No Discharge % Total 
Discharge No Discharge % Full Partial Full Partial 
First 
Circuit 26 12 2 12 54% 9 3 1 5 44% 
Third 
Circuit 29 7 0 22 24% 15 3 0 12 20% 
 
 
The dollar amounts of debts discharged through undue hardship 
determinations tended to be higher in the First Circuit.114 In that circuit, the 
average amount discharged was about $75,000, with a median of about 
$65,000. In the Third Circuit, the average discharge was about $41,000, with a 
median of about $20,000. The vast majority of discharges were for the entire 
student loan debts claimed in the petitions. 
In both circuits, larger debts were less likely to be discharged. In the First 
Circuit, the average debt in proceedings where no discharge was granted was 
about $163,000, with a median of about $184,000. In the Third Circuit, the 
average debt in these proceedings was about $78,000, with a median of about 
$51,000. 
There are a few possible reasons for the trends relating to larger debts. In 
the First Circuit, the trend may have been influenced by the educational 
backgrounds of debtors. Of the eight debtors who were unsuccessful in 
obtaining an undue hardship discharge (and for whom educational background 
could be discerned), six (or 75%) had degrees above the bachelor’s level.115 
These degrees included four Master’s degrees, a law degree, and a Ph.D.  
For the twelve debtors who obtained discharges (and for whom educational 
background could be discerned), three (or 25%) had degrees above the 
bachelor’s level—all law degrees.116 Moreover, educational background was 
considered to the detriment of only one of the fourteen successful debtors, 
compared to three of the twelve unsuccessful debtors.117 
Trends were more difficult to discern in the Third Circuit, due in large part 
to the relative infrequency of undue hardship discharge in the circuit. In fact, 
the trend of lower incidence of discharge for larger debts may have truly been 
 
114.  Given the interest-induced fluidity of the student loan balances, these figures are 
presented as approximations. 
115.  Educational background of four of these debtors could not be discerned. 
116.  Educational background of two of these debtors could not be discerned. 
117.  Educational background was only considered in five of the proceedings, to the 
detriment of debtors in four. The lone beneficial consideration resulted in discharge for a 
debtor possessing an associate’s degree. 
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random. A trend we discuss later—the fact that five of the seven successful 
discharges were for student loans debts accrued for the benefit of someone 
else—may be the more consequential (and mostly unrelated) cause of the 
discharge amount trends. 
2. Settlements 
Settlements of 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings tended to result in full 
relief or partial relief. The term “relief” in the settlement context betokens an 
agreement between the parties to settle the debt for an amount lower than what 
was owed.118 In both circuits, full relief tended to be more common, accounting 
for 59% (16/27) of settlement relief in the First Circuit and 57% (34/60) in the 
Third Circuit.  
The distinction between full and partial relief is important because the 
granting of partial relief is often premised on a debtor agreeing to make timely 
month payments on the new balance. If a debtor misses a payment, and some 
inevitably do, the relief is rescinded, and the original balance with interest 
becomes due. Debtors in this predicament have little recourse for once again 
seeking the discharge of the debt, because as part of the agreement for partial 
relief, the debtor stipulates that the debt does not represent an undue hardship. 
In the First Circuit, the average amount of settlement relief was about 
$31,000, with a median of about $19,000.119 In Third Circuit proceedings, the 
average was about $29,000, with a median of about $15,000.120 In both circuits, 
student loan balances tended to be higher in proceedings in which partial 
settlement relief was obtained than in those in which full relief was obtained.  
In the First Circuit, the average balance in full relief settlements was about 
$29,000, with a median of about $13,500. In the Third Circuit, full relief 
balances were about $24,000 on average, with a median of about $14,000. In 
proceedings in which partial relief was obtained, the average balance was about 
$89,000 in the First Circuit and $66,000 in the Third. Median balances were 
about $71,000 and about $37,000 in the First and Third circuits, respectively. 
Partial relief tended to be proportionally more generous in the Third 
Circuit. Average relief in that circuit was about $36,000, roughly 55% of the 
average balance of about 66,000.121 Median relief balance was about 19,000—
 
118.  In proceedings where the parties agree to settle the debt for an amount lower than 
the full debt, the agreements typically require debtors to stipulate that no undue hardship 
exists, and if the debtor breaches the terms of the agreement (usually payment obligations), 
the full debt would be due. By stipulating that no undue hardship exists, the plaintiff cannot 
seek to have the debt discharged pursuant to a later bankruptcy petition.  
119.  Of the 26 proceedings in which relief was obtained in the First Circuit, we were 
able to glean an amount of relief in 22.  
120.  Of the 61 proceedings in which relief was obtained in the Third Circuit, we were 
able to glean an amount of relief in 56. 
121.  Of the 27 Third Circuit proceedings in which partial relief was obtained, we were 
able to glean balances and relief amounts for 25. 
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or roughly 51% of the median balance of $37,000. In the First Circuit, average 
relief was about $33,000—37% of the average balance of about $89,000.122 
The median relief was about $22,000, or 31% of the median balance of about 
$71,000.  
3. Dismissals 
Dismissals were the most common resolution in both circuits between 2011 
and 2014. Dismissals were most often sought via joint motions, though 
sometimes on debtor motions. The underlying reasons for the dismissals varied 
and were not always disclosed in the settlement filings. Oftentimes, 
proceedings were dismissed in order to give the litigants an opportunity to 
reach other resolutions, such as allowing the debtor to enroll in an income-
based repayment plan123 or seek an administrative discharge due to a total and 
permanent disability. Sometimes the proceedings were dismissed because the 
debtor had actually received an administrative discharge, thereby rendering the 
proceeding moot. Dismissals could also be evidence of some debtors simply 
giving up on pursuing their claims, due to the expense and time associated with 
doing so. 
4. Default Judgments 
While default judgments could be entered in favor of either party, each of 
the 30 default judgments entered in the First and Third Circuits between 2011 
and 2014 was in favor of the plaintiff. This trend prompts us to theorize that 
most of these were strategic defaults by creditors who concluded that the 
plaintiffs had provable undue hardship claims. It seems doubtful that a creditor 
would unintentionally fail to respond to the filing of a 523(a)(8) adversary 
proceedings against it. Also, judges may deny motions for default based on 
insufficient facts, in spite of an opposing party’s unresponsiveness. Therefore, a 
judge’s granting of a motion for default is an acknowledgment that the plaintiff 
has pleaded facts sufficient to make a plausible undue hardship claim.  
5. Overall Relief 
When all types of resolutions are considered, plaintiffs secured student 
loan bankruptcy discharge or other relief in 51% of First Circuit proceedings 
and 46% of Third Circuit proceedings between 2011 and 2014. These 
proportions paint a very different picture than what we saw after only analyzing 
the undue hardship determinations. These trends likely reflect the proverbial 
 
122.  Of the 10 First Circuit proceedings in which partial relief was obtained, we were 
able to glean balances and relief amounts for nine.  
123.  See, e.g., Stipulation to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Without Prejudice, In Re 
Mattox, (Bankr. W.D. Pa. July 10, 2012) (No. 12-2055). 
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“bargaining in the shadow of the law” that is commonly associated with non-
litigation outcomes.124 Table 9 tracks the discharge and relief rates in each 
circuit by type.  
 
 
Table 9: Rates of discharge and relief in 523(a)(8) adversary 
proceedings 
 2011-2014 
 
Total 
number of 
proceedings 
Number of discharges/relief Overall 
discharge/ 
relief rate 
Undue 
Hardship Settlements Defaults 
First 
Circuit 91 4 27 15 50.5% 
Third 
Circuit 171 3 60 15 46% 
 
D. Factors Associated with Relief 
In order to understand the nature of student loan bankruptcy discharge and 
relief, it is important to assess the underlying factors. Factors fall into two 
broad categories: (1) characteristics of the debtor, and (2) structural factors.  
Characteristics of the debtor relate to things that are relevant to 
determining undue hardship. Judges commonly discussed the following six 
characteristics: (1) employment prospects; (2) health status; (3) eligibility for 
an income-based repayment plan; (4) age; (5) educational background; and (6) 
the ratio of student loan debt to total debt. In the settlement context, commonly 
cited characteristics included: (1) financial difficulties; (2) health status; and (3) 
age. 
Structural factors pertain to the court in which the proceeding was filed and 
whether the debtor is represented by counsel. The court in which a proceeding 
is filed is important because it determines the applicable undue hardship test 
and judicial receptiveness to the debtor’s prayer for relief.125 Whether the 
debtor is represented by counsel is important because legal representation is 
associated with higher incidences of discharge and relief.126  
 
124.  See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable 
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (providing an empirical analysis 
of this phenomenon in civil litigation). 
125.  We suspect that the judge to whom the case is assigned influences the outcome of 
proceedings, but the relative small number of proceedings analyzed in this study makes it 
difficult to confidently highlight any noteworthy trends.  
126.  See Tbls. 18 and 19, infra. 
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1. Debtor Characteristics: Undue Hardship Determinations 
In making undue hardship determinations, most judges explicated the 
factors upon which they relied.127 Between 2005 and 2014, debtor employment 
prospects were considered in 77% of First Circuit and 55% of Third Circuit 
undue hardship opinions. These proportions reflect the central role that 
determining a debtor’s current and future ability to earn income plays in undue 
hardship determinations. Debtors who, in the judge’s estimation had favorable 
employment prospects, were less likely to obtain a discharge than other 
debtors. For example, in In re Davis, the judge held that the debtor’s 
“educational background and experience” made her marketable to “a wide 
array of prospective employers.”128 This finding served as a basis for denying 
the debtor’s petition to have her student loans discharged based on hardship. 
Employment prospects interact with other factors—such as debtor age, 
health, and educational background—because they indicate the ability to gain 
and maintain employment, as well as the type of employment for which a 
debtor qualifies. Therefore, the proportions above understate the true 
prominence of employment prospects as a factor, as they only account for 
direct references in the judicial opinions. 
Health status was considered by judges in 58% of the First Circuit 
proceedings and 69% of the Third Circuit proceedings. Health status interacts 
with the employment prospects factor. In addition, health status can often 
provide context regarding how the debtor came to file bankruptcy in the first 
place.  
Eligibility for an income-based repayment plan was considered by judges 
in 62% of First Circuit proceedings and in 41% of Third Circuit proceedings. 
These alternative repayment plans are premised on providing relief for debtors 
experiencing difficulty repaying their loans through standard plans. A 
detrimental consideration of this factor could be a finding that a debtor had 
failed to avail herself of these alternative plans prior to seeking discharge. A 
beneficial consideration could be a finding that a debtor availed herself of such 
plans or that the plans would not have fundamentally changed the debtor’s 
financial hardship. It is often creditor-defendants that urge judges to consider 
this factor under the guise of proving a debtor’s bad faith. 
Debtor age was considered by judges in 31% of proceedings in the First 
Circuit and 28% in the Third. Like health status, age may often imply a 
debtor’s employment status and future employment prospects. Age can also 
determine the number of years in which a debtor could reasonably be expected 
to continue working, placing the length of the creditor-imposed repayment 
window into an undue hardship context. 
 
127.  Most of these explanations were presented in written opinions; however, some 
judges read their decisions in open court, in lieu of filing written opinions.  
128.  Davis v. Nat'l Collegiate Tr. (In re Davis), 526 B.R. 136, 147 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2015). 
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Debtor educational background, including whether the debtor completed 
the education for which the student loans were obtained, was considered by 
judges in 19% of First Circuit proceedings and 31% of Third Circuit 
proceedings. Like other factors, the primary significance of educational 
background was in the context of employment prospects. In considering this 
factor, debtors with more education were often assumed to have relatively 
favorable employment prospects.  
The ratio of debtors’ student loan debt to overall debt was considered by 
judges in 4% of First Circuit proceedings and 10% of Third Circuit 
proceedings. The premise of this consideration is a judicial disfavoring of 
bankruptcy petitions brought principally for the purpose of discharging student 
loans. Therefore, some judges view a high ratio of student loan debt as 
evidence of bad faith on the part of the debtor.129  
Table 10 charts the frequency in which each factor was explicitly 
considered by judges rendering undue hardship determinations. 
 
Table 10: Frequency of consideration of specific factors in undue 
hardship determinations 
 2005-2014 
 Employ prospects Health 
IBR 
Eligibility Age 
Education 
Background Ratio 
First 
Circuit 
77% 58% 61.5% 31% 19% 4% 
20/26 15/26 16/26 8/26 5/26 1/26 
Third 
Circuit 
55% 69% 41% 28% 31% 10% 
16/29 20/29 12/29 8/29 9/29 3/29 
 
2. Effects of Characteristics 
Factors could be considered either to the benefit or the detriment of a 
debtor. Some factors were more associated with beneficial consideration; others 
were associated with detrimental consideration. In the First Circuit, age and 
eligibility for an income-based repayment plan were considered to the benefit 
of debtors more than half of the time in which these factors were considered at 
all. In the Third Circuit, almost every factor was considered to the detriment of 
debtors. Employment prospects and health were the only factors that were 
 
129.  Fabrizio v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Fabrizio), 369 B.R. 238, 247 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 2007) (citing the fact that debtor’s student loan debt was 80% of the total debt the debtor 
was seeking to discharge as evidence of bad faith).  
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beneficial to debtors in at least 30% of considerations. Table 11 charts these 
trends. 
These trends could be reflections of differences in receptiveness to undue 
hardship claims between the different circuits. It might be that judges in the 
First Circuit were more likely to search for reasons to grant discharge, while 
judges in the Third Circuit were more likely to search for reasons to deny 
discharge. The disparate discharge rates between the circuits are likely 
manifestations of these approaches. 
 
Table 11: Proportion of beneficial consideration of specific factors in 
undue hardship determinations 
 2005-2014 
 Employ prospects130 Health 
IBR 
Eligibility131 Age
132 
Education 
Background
133 
Ratio 
First 
Circuit 
45% 40% 53% 62.5% 20% 100% 
10/22 6/15 10/19 5/8 1/5 1/1 
Third 
Circuit 
37.5% 30% 17% 12.5% 20% 0% 
6/16 6/20 2/12 1/8 2/10 0/3 
 
 
Some factors were more strongly associated with discharge than others. In 
First Circuit proceedings in which judges considered debtor employment 
prospects and eligibility for an income-based repayment plan, discharge was 
granted at a higher rate than average. On the other hand, when First Circuit 
judges considered debtor health status or educational background, discharge 
was granted at lower than average rates.  
In the Third Circuit, disproportionately high discharge rates were 
associated with the consideration of employment prospects and health status. 
 
130.  Employment prospects were considered in both favorable and detrimental ways in 
two proceedings in each the First and Third Circuits. 
131.  Eligibility for an income-sensitive repayment plan was considered in both 
favorable and detrimental ways in three proceedings in each the First and Third Circuits.  
132.  In the First Circuit, age was considered to the benefit of debtors in five 
proceedings. The average age of debtors in these proceedings was 57. The average in the 
other fifteen proceedings in which debtor age could be discerned (including three 
proceedings in which age was a detrimental factor) was 44. In the Third Circuit, age was a 
beneficial factor in just one proceeding where the debtor was 47 years old. In the other 
seventeen proceedings in which debtor age could be discerned (including seven in which age 
was a detrimental factor), the average age was 44.  
133.  Education background was considered in both favorable and detrimental ways in 
one proceeding in the Third Circuit. 
2016] OH, WHAT A RELIEF IT (SOMETIMES) IS  327 
The consideration of debtor eligibility for an income-based repayment plan, 
educational background, or age was associated with below-average discharge 
rates. Table 12 charts undue hardship discharge rates based on the 
consideration of specific factors. 
 
Table 12: Rates of discharge by consideration of specific factors in 
undue hardship determinations 
 2005-2014 
 Overall Age Education Background 
Employ 
prospects Health 
IBR 
Eligibility Ratio 
First 
Circuit 52% 
50% 40% 55% 47% 56% 100% 
4/8 2/5 11/20 7/15 9/16 1/1 
Third 
Circuit 24% 
12.5% 11% 31% 30% 8% 0% 
1/8 1/9 5/16 6/20 1/12 0/3 
 
 
Viewing the effects of the factors through the frame of identifying those 
factors most likely to lead to discharge yields a couple interesting trends. In the 
First Circuit, ten of the 14 (71%) debtors who received discharges were found 
to have unfavorable employment prospects. In the Third Circuit, six of the 
seven (86%) debtors who received discharges were found to have health issues, 
with explicit ties being made to employment prospects for five of the six.  
Another interesting trend emerged in the Third Circuit, whereby five of the 
seven debtors (71%) who received discharges incurred the student loan debts 
for the benefit of someone else’s education, usually a dependent child.134 Put 
another way, five of the six debtors (83%) who incurred the student loan debt 
in this way obtained a discharge. No such trends were observed in the First 
Circuit.135 
These trends suggest that the debtors most likely to receive discharge had 
unfavorable employment prospects, coupled with an aggravating factor such as 
health issues—and in the Third Circuit, they obtained the student loan debt for 
another person’s benefit. The numbers are too small to identify definitive 
profiles, but these trends seem both stark and intuitive. 
 
 
 
134.  These debtors either co-signed on a student loan for another person or secured a 
Parent PLUS loan through the federal student aid program. The beneficiary was typically a 
dependent child. 
135.  In the First Circuit, only three of the debtors in undue hardship proceedings 
incurred the debt for someone else’s benefit; one of them obtained a discharge. 
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3. Debtor Characteristics: Settlements 
Unlike judicial opinions, settlement agreements and orders do not typically 
identify reasons underlying a resolution. We addressed this issue, however, by 
imputing reasons for relief using the claims made in debtor complaints, but 
only in proceedings where the amount of relief exceeded two-thirds of the 
student loan debt and no reasons were explicated elsewhere. We reasoned that 
creditors would be unwilling to agree to large relief, unless the facts as 
presented in the debtor’s complaint were provable.  
In the First Circuit, there were eighteen proceedings in which a reason 
underlying the relief could be identified or imputed; in the Third Circuit, there 
were 42. Settlement relief appeared to be based on at least one of the following 
three debtor characteristics: (1) financial condition; (2) health status; and (3) 
age. Akin to employment prospects in undue hardship determinations, debtor 
financial difficulty was the fundamental basis underlying almost all relief. The 
significance of the two other factors—health status and age—was most often 
rooted in the extent to which they affected debtor finances. Therefore, financial 
difficulty was accompanied as a factor by at least one other factor in the 
majority of proceedings in which relief was obtained. 
In one First Circuit proceeding and in seventeen Third Circuit proceedings, 
financial difficulty was the sole identified or imputed factor. We found it 
noteworthy that in these proceedings, relief seemed to be obtained without any 
additional or aggravating characteristics beyond debtor present and presumably 
future inability to pay. It is possible that other factors were influential in 
settlement negotiations, though these factors were not mentioned in ways that 
were amenable to identification.  
We were able to identify or impute health issues in thirteen of the eighteen 
(72%) First Circuit proceedings that resulted in relief and in half of the 42 
proceedings in the Third Circuit. Drilling down further, five of the thirteen 
(38%) health-related settlements in the First Circuit were based on findings that 
the debtor had a total and permanent disability.136 This type of disability 
accounted for only two of the 21 (10%) health-related settlements in the Third 
Circuit. Debtor age was identified or imputed as a factor in 22% of proceedings 
that resulted in relief in the First Circuit and 24% in the Third Circuit. 
Table 13 lists the frequency in which age or health was identified or 
imputed as a factor underlying settlement relief. The table also lists the number 
of proceedings in which financial difficulty was the only identified or imputed 
factor underlying the relief.  
 
 
 
 
136.  In these proceedings, the debtors had not already obtained an administrative 
discharge. 
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Table 13: Frequency of specific factors being identified or imputed as 
underlying settlement discharges 
 2011-2014 
 Age Health Financial difficulty 
First Circuit 
22% 72% 
1 
4/18 13/18 
Third Circuit 
24% 50% 
17 
10/42 21/42 
 
4. Structural Factors 
As mentioned earlier, the court in which a proceeding is filed is important 
because it determines the applicable undue hardship test and the judicial 
receptiveness to the debtor’s claim. Additionally, legal representation is 
associated with higher incidences of discharge and relief. 
a. Court in Which Proceeding is Filed 
Debtors in the First Circuit were more than twice as likely as debtors in the 
Third Circuit to secure a discharge through an undue hardship determination. 
Over the ten-year period, 2005-2014, discharge was granted in more than half 
(52%) of First Circuit undue hardship determinations, but less than a quarter 
(24%) of such determinations in the Third Circuit.  
Disparities play out among the judicial districts as well. As a threshold 
matter, the number of undue hardship determinations varied widely. In the First 
Circuit, only two districts—Massachusetts and New Hampshire—had more 
than one undue hardship determination. Each of the Third Circuit districts had 
at least one undue hardship determination over the 10-year period. But the 
number of determinations varied—from one in the Delaware District to eleven 
in the New Jersey District.  
Over the ten-year period, the New Hampshire District (in the First Circuit) 
had the highest rate of discharge in undue hardship determinations (67%); the 
Western District of Pennsylvania (in the Third Circuit) had the lowest rate 
(10%).  
 
Table 14 lists the number of undue hardship determinations and the 
frequency of discharge in the First and Third Circuits respectively. 
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Table 14: Frequency of First Circuit undue hardship determinations 
and discharge 
First Circuit: 2005-2014 Third Circuit: 2005-2014 
 Undue 
hardship 
determination 
Discharge 
Percentage 
 Undue 
hardship 
determination 
Discharge 
Percentage 
Maine 1/1 100% Delaware 0/1 0% 
Massachusetts 9/19 47% New Jersey 3/11 27% 
New Hampshire 4/6 67% PA (ED) 2/5 40% 
Puerto Rico 0 -- PA (MD) 1/2 50% 
Rhode Island 0 -- PA (WD) 1/10 10% 
 
 
Disparities among the districts narrow somewhat when the number of 
undue hardship discharges is viewed in light of the total number of 523(a)(8) 
adversary proceedings filed in each district.137 Viewing the trends in this way 
highlights the relative rarity of undue hardship discharges, which reflects the 
rarity of undue hardship determinations overall.  
In six districts—three in each the First and Third Circuits—no debtors 
received discharges through an undue hardship determination. In the New 
Hampshire District, 12.5% of all 523(a)(8) adversarial proceedings filed 
between 2011 and 2014 resulted in a discharge through an undue hardship 
determination. This is the highest proportion among all districts in both circuits. 
But this proportion is misleading, since it represents only one such discharge 
out of eight proceedings. And no other district had a relative discharge rate in 
double-digits. The Massachusetts District had the next highest rate at 6%, with 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the New Jersey District following at 
4% and 3% respectively.  
 
Tables 15 list the relative discharge rates through an undue hardship 
determination between 2011 and 2014 in the First and Third Circuits 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
137.  Given the concerns about the completeness of the online records, this inquiry 
required us to focus the analysis on the four-year period, 2011-15. 
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Table 15: Relative discharge rates via undue hardship determination 
First Circuit: 2011-2014 Third Circuit: 2011-2014 
 U.H. 
discharge 
Total 
APs 
Relative 
discharge  
U.H. 
discharge Total APs 
Relative 
discharge 
Maine 0 20 0% DE 0 4 0% 
MA 3 53 6% NJ 2 58 3% 
NH 1 8 12.5% PA (ED) 0 45 0% 
Puerto 
Rico 0 1 0% 
PA 
(MD) 1 27 4% 
RI 0 9 0% PA (WD) 0 37 0% 
Total 4 91 4% Total 3 171 2% 
 
b. Effects of Different Undue Hardship Tests 
A primary culprit behind the disparate rates of undue hardship discharge 
between the circuits could very well be the different undue hardship tests 
applied in the circuits. Judges in the First Circuit may opt to apply either the 
totality or Brunner test, but totality predominates. Of the twenty-three First 
Circuit determinations in our analysis in which a test could be discerned, judges 
applied the totality test in eighteen and the Brunner test in five.138 On the other 
hand, judges in the Third Circuit only apply the Brunner test.  
 
The Brunner test is considered substantively more stringent than the 
totality test.139 As such, it seems unsurprising that the rate of undue hardship 
discharge would be higher in proceedings in which the totality test was applied. 
In our review, the rate of discharge between 2005 and 2014 was 44% in totality 
 
138.  We were unable to discern the test in three of the proceedings.  
139.  See, e.g., G. Michael Bedinger IV, Time for a Fresh Look at the “Undue 
Hardship” Bankruptcy Standard for Student Debtors, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1817, 1829 (2014) 
(“[T]he Brunner test’s conjunctive structure extinguishes the inquiry of a debt’s 
dischargeability, perhaps prematurely, if the debtor fails any one of the test’s prongs. The 
totality test, on the other hand, possesses the flexibility to consider ‘any additional facts and 
circumstances unique to the case’ without relying on any one factor as dispositive.”) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Hicks, 331 B.R. 18, at 26.). 
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proceedings (all in the First Circuit) and 32% in the Brunner proceedings 
(mostly from the Third Circuit). 
But even though the particular test applied influences a plaintiff’s chances 
of an undue hardship discharge, there is more to the story. Both tests—even the 
rather rigid Brunner—allow for judicial subjectivities to influence outcomes. 
This reality seems highlighted by the fact that First Circuit judges granted 
discharge in 80% of proceedings in which they applied the Brunner test, while 
the discharge rate in the Third Circuit—which exclusively applies the Brunner 
test—was just 24%. Table 16 charts discharge rates based on specific test used. 
 
Table 16: Relative discharge rates via undue hardship determination  
 2005-2014 
 Both Circuits First Circuit Third Circuit 
Brunner 32% 11/34 80% 4/5 24% 7/29 
Totality * * 44% 8/18 * * 
 
 
While the numbers of cases are too small for us to comfortably draw 
definitive conclusions, they nonetheless suggest fundamentally different 
perceptions of undue hardship. As remarked earlier, it might be that judges in 
the First Circuit were more likely to search for reasons to grant discharge, while 
judges in the Third Circuit were more likely to search for reasons to deny 
discharge. And this may have been true irrespective of the test applied. 
Undue hardship determinations are uncommon, but we suspect that they 
hold broader influence over how proceedings are resolved. For example, 
litigants might be more or less willing to negotiate a settlement based on their 
perceived odds of success before a bankruptcy judge—bargaining in the 
shadow of the law. Similarly, creditors might be more willing to allow a debtor 
to obtain relief through a default judgement if they feel the debtor has a strong 
undue hardship claim.  
 
In our review, we found speculative hints of the effects of the different 
judicial postures between the circuits, most notably pertaining to default 
judgments. Relief through default judgments was more common in the First 
Circuit than in the Third. Seventeen percent (17%) of First Circuit proceedings 
ended in default judgment in favor of the debtor, compared to in 9% of 
proceedings in the Third Circuit. The default judgment trends are interesting 
because they represent both a seemingly willful lack of defense on the parts of 
creditors as well as judicial findings that the debtors’ claims were at least 
plausible. Most significantly, default judgments also represent full discharge of 
the student loan debt.  
An intriguing question is whether the higher proportion of default 
judgments in the First Circuit were influenced by the manner in which judges 
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tend to decide undue hardship determinations in each circuit. In the First 
Circuit, some creditors might be more willing to allow a default judgment 
based on a feeling that mounting a defense is useless. 
c. Counsel Representation 
A 523(a)(8) adversary proceeding is essentially a trial within the larger 
bankruptcy case. The evidentiary and fact-finding burdens render these 
proceedings daunting for most debtor-plaintiffs. Legal representation in these 
proceedings can be costly, especially for people already experiencing financial 
distress. Unfortunately, debtors unable (or unwilling) to retain legal 
representation were less likely to obtain student loan discharge or settlement 
relief. 
Most debtors who filed 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings in the First and 
Third Circuits between 2011 and 2014 were represented by counsel. A higher 
proportion of debtors were represented in the First Circuit (82%) than in the 
Third (77%). A review of counsel representation based on the type of 
resolution yielded interesting trends. In both circuits, the proportion of debtors 
represented by counsel was highest in proceedings that ended in default 
judgements for debtors and lowest in proceedings for which an undue hardship 
determination was rendered. The trends, taken together, suggest that lawyers 
were often effective at securing resolutions at stages that were more favorable 
to their clients than the undue hardship hearing.  
This suggestion is particularly strong in the Third Circuit, where only 47% 
of debtors were represented by counsel in proceedings that ended with an 
undue hardship determination—a proportion more than 30% lower than the 
circuit’s overall rate of representation. First Circuit debtors whose proceedings 
were resolved by an undue hardship determination were represented at a much 
higher rate than their counterparts in the Third. But the 78% rate was still tied 
with dismissals for the lowest among all First Circuit debtors. Table 17 presents 
the counsel representation trends. 
 
Table 17: Proportion of counsel representation based on type of 
resolution 
 2011-2014 
 Undue Hardship Settlements 
Settlement- 
Dismissals Defaults Overall Percentage 
First 
Circuit 7/9 78% 22/27 81% 32/41 78% 14/15 93% 75/92 81.5% 
Third 
Circuit 7/15 47% 49/60 82% 62/78 79% 13/15 87% 131/168 78% 
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 Counsel representation was not only associated with different types of 
resolutions, but also with higher rates of discharge. This trend was particularly 
profound in proceedings in which an undue hardship determination was made. 
In both the First and Third Circuits, 100% of plaintiffs who received a 
discharge from a judge between 2011 and 2014 were represented by counsel. 
Conversely, only 60% of plaintiffs who received an unfavorable undue 
hardship determination in the First Circuit and 33% in the Third Circuit were 
represented by counsel. These trends hold even when undue hardship 
determinations alone are analyzed along the ten-year timeframe.  
Table 18 charts representation trends based on resolution during the four-
year period, 2011-2014. Table 19 charts representation trends in undue 
hardship determinations during the 10-year period, 2005-2014.  
 
Table 18: Proportion of counsel representation of debtors by 
discharge/relief status 
 2011-2014 
 Overall 
Undue Hardship Settlements Default 
Discharge No Discharge Relief Dismissal Discharge 
First Circuit 81.5% 
100% 60% 81% 78% 93% 
4/4 3/5 22/27 32/41 14/15 
Third Circuit 77% 
100% 33% 82% 79% 87% 
3/3 4/12 49/60 62/78 13/15 
 
 
Table 19: Proportion of counsel representation of debtors by undue 
hardship determination discharge status 
 2005-2014 
 Overall 
Undue Hardship 
Discharge No Discharge 
First Circuit 73% 
86% 58% 
12/14 7/12 
Third Circuit 52% 
86% 41% 
6/7 9/22 
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In both circuits, debtors who received settlement relief were slightly more 
likely to be represented by counsel than those who agreed to dismiss their 
proceedings. This trend was driven by debtors who received full settlement 
relief. Ninety-four percent of First Circuit debtors who received full settlement 
relief were represented by counsel; the proportion was ninety-one percent in the 
Third Circuit. On the other hand, only about 70% of debtors in both circuits 
who secured partial relief were represented by counsel. These latter proportions 
fall below the overall representation rates in both circuits as well as the rate 
among those who agreed to dismiss their proceedings. Table 20 charts 
representation trends in settlements based on whether relief was full or partial. 
 
Table 20: Proportion of counsel representation of debtors by type of 
settlement relief 
 2011-2014 
 Overall 
Settlement Relief Settlement/ 
Dismissals Full Partial 
First Circuit 81% 
94% 70% 78% 
15/16 7/10 32/41 
Third Circuit 79% 
91% 70% 79% 
31/34 19/27 62/78 
 
 
Dismissals were sometimes motivated by the debtor having received an 
administrative discharge due to a total and permanent disability, rendering the 
proceeding moot. There were eleven such dismissals between the circuits—one 
in the First Circuit and ten in the Third. Relatedly, there were seven full relief 
settlements—five in the First Circuit and two in the Third—that were based on 
debtors producing documentation supporting claims of a total and permanent 
disability (in effect an extreme health issue), though they had not received an 
administrative discharge.  
Given the difficulty of proving total and permanent disability, we thought it 
would be useful to assess whether debtors who were successful in doing so 
were more likely to be represented by counsel. Confirming our suspicions, we 
found that the debtor had legal representation in each of the eighteen 
proceedings. 
Lastly, when we compared all forms of discharge and relief to all other 
outcomes (including dismissals), the associations between counsel 
representation and favorable outcomes remained stark. Put simply, debtors who 
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were represented by counsel were more likely to obtain favorable outcomes. 
Table 21 charts these trends. 
 
Table 21: Proportion of counsel representation of plaintiffs by 
discharge/relief status 
 2011-2014 
 Discharge/Relief No Discharge/No Relief 
First Circuit 89% 74.5% 42/47 35/47 
Third Circuit 83.5% 68.5% 81/97 50/73 
 
CONCLUSION 
As stated earlier, the goal of this Article is to provide insight on what 
happens when debtors seek to have student loans discharged as part of a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. We hope that this information adds some, albeit 
limited, clarity to an area of legal practice that is broadly misunderstood. We 
caution against drawing general conclusions from the data above, beyond the 
two circuits analyzed. This Article is intended to be a precursor to a national 
study we are undertaking. In that study, we plan to analyze a broader set of 
factors and trends, including more robust analyses of the effects of judges and 
lawyers as well as the different undue hardship tests on resolutions. 
Limited scope aside, the trends in this article highlight the error of 
assuming that obtaining bankruptcy relief from student loans is impossible. 
Obtaining relief is surely not an easy undertaking. The laborious (and 
expensive) manner in which these proceedings have to be litigated contributes 
to power asymmetries that benefit creditors. But relief is possible, and we 
imagine there are many debtors who have been counseled against or otherwise 
discouraged from pursuing discharge—even though they may have benefited 
from the attempt. If the information in this Article informs and empowers 
debtors, lawyers, and others to whom it may be relevant, we will consider this 
undertaking a success. 
 
